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1. Introduction
Unlike most investment or consumption goods, housing units differ in attributes that are
difficult to measure. Establishing the relationship between housing price and the service
flow of housing is an empirical challenge because the transaction price and rent of the same
property are rarely simultaneously observed and rental properties are usually qualitatively
different from owner-occupied housing. This study is an empirical analysis on cross-sectional
comparison of price-to-rent ratios, taking advantage of housing market data of two major
Chinese cities.
In China, an urban complex of high-rises (we call estate) typically comprises rental units
and owner-occupied units of a similar quality. Using over twelve thousand observations on
price and over nine thousand observations on rental transactions in Shanghai and Shenzhen,
we develop a Bayesian approach to estimating the relationship between prices of housing
units and their unobserved rents. Our analysis on latent rents of owner-occupied units sheds
new lights on the pricing of housing, complementing the existing approach of the present
value model, hedonic pricing, and pricing based on repeated sales.
A voluminous literature has been devoted to the time series behavior of price-to-rent
ratio (for a survey of the literature see Himmelberg & Sinai (2005).) A number of authors
(e.g., Mankiw & Weil (1989), Clark (1995), Meese & Wallace (1994), Clayton (1996)) find
that the present value of aggregate housing price indexes in North America is sensitive to
the rent index data. The researchers also recognize the difficulty in measuring the rent index
because rental properties may differ in quality from the owner-occupied homes. 2 As an
2There are a number of novel approaches to imputing rent index. Meese & Wallace (1994) use generated
hedonic price indices and two different rent indices. One is the rent component of the U.S. Consumer Price
Index, and the other index is a rent series based on “asking rents for two-bedroom condos pulled from
local newspapers”. Clark (1995) uses neighborhood data instead of city data to minimize measurement
errors. Clayton (1996) proxies imputed rents with a function of housing market fundamentals such as net
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alternative to the rent-based pricing model, hedonic pricing method is often used to estimate
the market value of real estate features such as lot size, number and size of rooms, number
of bathrooms, house age, and environmental characteristics. 3 A limitation of the hedonic
pricing approach is that it does not directly link price to the latent rent of the property and
does not reflect unobservable quality difference in the hedonic features for different estates.
Case & Shiller (1989) focus on price changes of repeated home sales to circumvent the need
for estimating the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on real estate pricing. This approach
is effective in capturing the time series of housing price but does not reveal cross-sectional
differences in housing values. Our research complements these approaches by combining
hedonic features with rent and price to study how the price of a housing unit relates to its
latent rent.
Our empirical model consists of price and rent equations. In the rent equation, the
property fixed effects on rent are estimated from data of rental units. The price equation
links the price of a unit sold to its latent rent and other factors. A prominent feature of
our rent-based pricing model lies in its cross-estate heterogeneity, which requires inference
for thousands of parameters. Because of the limited observations of the price and rent data
(about ten on average for each estate), the asymptotic distribution can be misleading for
our problem. In this study, we conduct finite sample inference through a Bayesian approach,
which produces probability distribution of parameters conditioning on the observed sample.
The Bayesian approach is particularly effective for models with heterogeneity where the
number of parameters is large relatively to the number of observations. In a Bayesian
immigration of households and the inventory of newly completed but unsold homes.
3Some examples of hedonic pricing studies on data of various countries include Goodman (1988), Can
(1990), Downes & Zabel (2002), Vanderford et al. (2005), Bao & Wan (2004), Mats (2002), Witte et al.
(1979), Ridker & Henning (1967), Kim (1992)), Schwartz et al. (2003), Hughes & Sirmans (1992), Basu &
Thibodeau (1998), Coulson & Bond (1990), among others.
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framework, we can use information of the housing market for eliciting priors of parameters for
each estate to produce sharper inference. The Bayesian approach is often used for drawing
finite sample inference of latent parameters and missing data. We use the information
obtained from of the rental units to elicit priors of the latent rent of a unit sold. The
posterior of the latent rent is simulated jointly with other parameters in the model. We
use Bayes factors as the criterion to select from competing models. We find strong evidence
supporting heterogeneous (estate-specific) models of price and rent.
Recently, an innovative study by Hui et al. (2010) applies Bayesian method to pricing of
Hong Kong’s real estate market. Similar to the markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen, the Hong
Kong residential market mainly consists of high-rise estates with multiple units of similar
features in each estate. Hui et al. (2010) develop a Bayesian hierarchical model that makes
use of information of units in the same estate for efficient estimation of pricing factors of
each unit. Hui et al. (2010) show the Bayesian approach is effective in drawing inference of
a large number of parameters, as we do in this study. However, our study has a different
research objective from that by Hui et al. (2010). Hui et al. (2010) focus on advancing the
literature of hedonic pricing by using the transaction price data only, we focus on cross-
sectional comparison of the price-rent ratios by using both the transaction price and rental
data.
We address two questions concerning the cross-sectional distribution of the price of hous-
ing units relative to their fundamentals. First, “How large is the dispersion in the price-
to-rent ratio across housing units?” We find that the cross-estate standard deviation of
estimated price-to-rent ratio is substantial: about forty percent for Shanghai and twenty
three percent for Shenzhen. The second empirical question is “How is the price-to-rent ratio
correlated with features of the property?” We find that the price-to-rent ratio is higher for
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low-end housing. The cross estate correlation of estate-fixed effects of price-to-rent ratio and
that of rent is −0.87 for Shanghai and −0.63 for Shenzhen. Economic explanations for the
high price-to-rent ratio of low-end housing considered in the paper include better growth
prospects of estates in newly developed locations and stronger demand for low-end housing
due to a variety of housing market features and government subsidies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the models for latent rent
and the pricing models. It also includes a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for
posterior simulation. Section 3 presents empirical results on Bayesian model selection and
estimation. Section 4 offers economic explanations to the phenomenon that low-end estates
tend to carry a high price-to-rent ratio. Section 5 concludes.
2. A Bayesian Framework of Real Estate Pricing
2.1. Pricing Real Estate Based on Latent Rent
For estate i (i = 1, · · · , I) apartment unit sold j, (j = 1, · · · , Ji), the price equation is
Pij = ci + αiRˆij + y
′
ijβ + ij, (1)
where Pij is the logarithm of the price of apartment j in estate i, Rˆij is the logarithm of
the latent rent of unit j in estate i, y ′ij is a row-vector of factors that influence real estate
pricing, for instance macroeconomic variables such as mortgage rates. β is a column vector
of unknown parameters. The pricing error ij is assumed to be normal N(0, σ
2
i ).
The rent equation is given by
Rik = µi + x
′
ikθ + νik, (2)
where Rik is the logarithm of the observed rent of rental unit k (k = 1, · · · , Ki) in estate
i (i = 1, · · · , I), x ′ik is a row-vector of seasonal and unit-specific factors that influence rent
(e.g. the size of the unit, the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, the condition of the unit,
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etc.) We assume that the error term νik is normal N(0, τ
2
i ).
The price and rent equations contain three types of heterogeneity in regression coef-
ficients: µi, ci, and αi. The estate-fixed effect µi captures the location, environmental
characteristics, the quality of property management service, and other intangibles beyond
the hedonic factors included in the rent equation. The parameter ci reflects the estate-fixed
effect on price conditioning on the latent rent and other factors. The parameter αi concerns
heterogeneity in the price elasticity with respect to the latent rent. There are eight combi-
nations of model restrictions to be compared. For instance, a heterogenous pricing model
without estate-fixed effect for rent is defined by µi = µ while ci and αi are estate-specific
for (i = 1, · · · , I). In the most restrictive homogenous pricing model, the estate-fixed effect
is absent and all parameters are constant across estates. We will show that the empirical
result strongly favors the presence of estate-specific fixed effects.
We noted earlier that we observe rental and sale prices of units in the same estate but few
units are sold and rented at the same time. We need to develop methodologies for estimation
of the latent rents of units sold using the information from rent data from the same estate,
for which we conduct a Bayesian analysis.
We assume that the unobserved rent of unit j sold in estate i follows the same distribution
as rental units given in equation (2):
Rˆij = µi + xˆ
′
ijθ + νij. (3)
An alternative way of viewing the assumption is that we set the prior for the unobserved rent
of a unit sold conditioning on its hedonic features and model parameters as Rˆij ∼ N(µi +
xˆ ′ijθ, τ
2
i ). The price equation (1) depicts the likelihood function of parameters including the
unobserved rent. Vector xˆij captures observable hedonic features of the unit j sold in estate
i. The posterior of the latent rent Rˆij will be simulated along with other parameters.
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A common frequentist solution to unobservable regressors is the instrumental variables
approach. By the IV approach, we can treat the rent equation as the first-stage regression and
the pricing equation as the second stage regression, based on the instruments of the observed
rents of units rented in the same estate and hedonic factors of the units sold. In contrast
to the IV approach, the Bayesian approach conducts joint inference for the parameters in
the rent and price equations. The information in the price data contributes to the posterior
of the imputed rent. Zellner (1970) argues that Bayesian analysis for regression models
is preferable when the sample size is small. Although some advances have been made in
finite sample hypothesis testing in error-in-variable regressions with homogenous parameters
(e.g., Dufour & Jasiak (2001)), the frequentist finite sample distributions of heterogenous
parameters are complicated. Bayesian approach is convenient for dealing with heterogenous
parameters and measurement errors. Zellner (1970) uses non-informative priors for Bayesian
analysis in a regression model with unobservable independent variables. In the present study,
we follow the strategy taken by Rossi & Allenby (1993) and elicit informative priors for a
large number of estate-specific parameters using information borrowed from data of the whole
sample. This approach is designed for sharper inference of estate-specific parameters.
2.2 Prior setting
We assume the following prior setting: ci ∼ N(c¯, v¯c
2), αi ∼ N(α¯, v¯α
2), β ∼ N(β¯,B),
σ2i ∼ IG(sσ, vσ), µi ∼ N(µ¯, v¯µ
2), θ ∼ N(θ¯ ,Θ), τ 2i ∼ IG(sτ , vτ ). The prior setting for param-
eters in heterogenous parameter model is as follows. Following Rossi & Allenby (1993), we
elicit priors for estate-specific parameters using the posterior of the homogenous (constant)
parameter model (where no parameter is estate specific) under flat prior. Normal prior
means of parameter (ci, αi, µi) are set as their posterior means in the constant parameter
model. Posterior variances are set as the number of estates (733 for Shanghai and 125 for
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Shenzhen) times the posterior variances of the corresponding parameters in the homogenous
model. Inverse Gamma priors for σ2i and τ
2 are set as IG(3, 0.3) and IG(3, 0.2), which have
means of 0.15 and 0.1 and standard deviations of 0.15 and 0.1. We consider alternative
sets of hyperparameters and find that the reported empirical results are robust to the prior
setting.
2.3 Decomposing the price-to-rent ratio by factors
To explore the determinants of the estimated price-to-rent ratio, we decompose the price-
to-rent ratio into estate-specific, unit-specific, and macroeconomic factors.
Taking the difference of the logarithm of price in (1) and logarithm of imputed rent in
(3), we have the logarithm of the price-to-rent ratio
Pij − Rˆij = [ci + (αi − 1)µi] + (αi − 1)xˆ
′
ijθ + y
′
ijβ + (ij + (αi − 1)νij). (4)
Note that since the latent rent is unobserved, so is the price-to-rent ratio. In (4) the price-
to-rent ratio is explicitly decomposed. The term ci + (αi − 1)µi ≡ fi, is the estate-specific
factor. Empirically, this turns out to be the dominating factor of the price-rent ratio. The
second term (αi − 1)xij
′θ ≡ uij is a unit-specific factor that captures the effect of hedonic
features of the unit on the price-to-rent ratio.
One important factor of housing price is the value of land user right. In China, land is
state owned but land user right is tradable and transferable. According to the government
regulation, owners of commercialized residential housing has a limited time of land use
(usually 70 years from the date of the initial commercialization of the real estate or the
initial development of the land). When the lease on the land expiries, its owner-occupier
is expected to either extend the lease by paying a renewal fee, or revert the housing to the
state. The effect of the land use policy on housing price is largely unexplored empirically.
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The Shenzhen data contain the year each estate became commercialized (from which we
can calculate the remaining years of the user right). The land user effect is measured by
eij = δlij, where lij is the remaining years of the land user right at the time unit j in estate
i is sold. y ′ijβ is the sum of the macroeconomic and seasonal factors and the user right
factor. The seasonal and macroeconomic effect is measured by part of the unit-specific effect
mij = y
′
ijβ − eij.
The remaining portion of the price-to-rent ratio, ξij = ij + (αi − 1)νij, is a pricing error
that can not be attributed to factors mentioned above. With this notion, from (4), the
price-rent ratio λij = Pij − Rˆij can be written as
λij = fi + uij +mij + eij + ξij. (5)
In the following we will discuss how to simulate numerical distributions of the posterior of
model parameters. The posteriors of price-to-rent ratio and its components, (λij, fi, uij, eij,mij),
can be computed from the simulated posteriors of model parameters.
2.4. Posterior simulation
Let
Pi =


Pi,1
...
Pi,Ji

 , Rˆi =


Rˆi,1
...
Rˆi,Ji

 , Ri =


Ri,1
...
Ri,Ki

 , yi =


y ′i,1
...
y ′i,Ji

 , xi =


x ′i,1
...
x ′i,Ki

 xˆi =


xˆ ′i,1
...
xˆ ′i,Ji

 . (6)
The variables with ‘hat’ (Rˆi, xˆi) pertain to the units sold, while those without ‘hat’ pertain to
rental units in estate i. Denote data D = {Pi,Ri, yi, xi} , (i = 1, · · · , N), and the collection
of µi, ci, and αi for all i = 1, · · · , I by {µ, α, c}. The joint posterior is
pi(α, β , µ, θ, σ, τ , c | D)
∝ L(P|Rˆ, α, c, β , σ)pi(Rˆ|µ, θ, τ , xˆ)L(R|θ, µ, τ )pi(β )pi(θ)pi(σ)pi(τ )pi(α)pi(µ)pi(c).
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Unlike the conventional regression model, the presence of the endogenous latent rent Rˆij
in the price equation implies that the marginal posteriors of the regression coefficients are
not standard distributions. In Bayesian analysis, when the posterior does not follow a stan-
dard distribution, researchers usually use numerical draws from the posterior for computing
quantities of interest. A common approach to numerical draws is MCMC Gibbs sampling,
based on the posterior of each parameter conditional on the data and other parameters in
the model.
In the appendix, we present the conditional posteriors and a Gibbs sampling algorithm.
We focus on the simulation of the posterior for Model 1, the most general model in Table 1.
The algorithms for more restricted models such as Models 2 to 8 are similar and are omitted
(we only need to replace vector parameters ci or αi for i = 1, , · · · , N by scalar parameters c
or α.)
Using the simulated posteriors, the eight combinations of specifications on (µ, c, α) will
be compared through Bayesian model selection.
2.5 Bayesian model selection
We compare competing models on the basis of posterior probability of the model given
the data D, pr(M |D). pr(D|M) is the product of prior probability pr(M) and the marginal
likelihood of the data given the model. The marginal likelihood is obtained by integrating
out model parameters in the posterior. The choice between two competing models M1 and
M2 depends on the ratio
pr(M1|D)
pr(M2|D)
= pr(M1)
pr(M2)
× pr(D|M1)
pr(D|M2)
, that is, posterior odds=prior odds ×
Bayes factor. When the prior probabilities of the competing models are equal (pr(M1) =
pr(M2) = 0.5), the Bayes factor B12 =
pr(D|M1)
pr(D|M2)
greater than unity suggests the data are in
favor of Model 1 over Model 2. The strength of evidence is given by the size of the Bayes
factor. Kass & Raftery (1995) suggest a guideline in interpreting Bayes factors: If the natural
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logarithm of the Bayes factor is between 1 and 3, the evidence is “positive”; between 3 and
5, the evidence is “strong”; and above 5, the evidence is “very strong.” In each model, the
posterior is simulated by 10000 MCMC cycles after 10000 “burn in” runs. We report the
model selection result in Table 1 and conduct empirical analysis of the price-rent ratio based
on the selected model. We calculate the marginal likelihood of each model by integrating
parameters analytically whenever possible and then using the harmonic mean for numerical
approximation of the remaining portion of the integration.
3. Empirical Results
3.1 Data
The data of two major cities in China, Shanghai and Shenzhen, from January 2003 to
December 2005, were provided by Centaline Property Consultants Ltd. China. The data
for Shanghai include 7303 rental transactions (each with an observation of monthly rent)
and 10335 resale transactions of 733 estates. The data for Shenzhen consist of 2061 rental
transactions and 2416 resale transactions of 125 estates. These transactions are made on
secondary market so there are considerable variations in the time of transactions across
apartment units within each estate.
In this study, transaction price and monthly rent are in RMB Yuan per square meter.
The Shanghai data include the following hedonic features: the floor level of the apartment,
the number of bedrooms, the number of living rooms, the number of restrooms, and the
size of the apartment. In addition, measurements of the quality of interior decoration and
furniture, kitchen cabinets, and accessories, are grouped into three categories: none, simple,
or luxurious. The Shenzhen data are more limited, the size of the apartment is the only
observable feature for all units. For both markets, in the rent equation we control for month
and year dummies. Besides the latent rent, control variables in the price equation include
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mortgage rate at the time of purchase for Shanghai; and mortgage rate and the remaining
years of the land user right for Shenzhen.
3.2. Results of model selection
Table 1 lists the log marginal likelihoods of eight competing models. For both Shenzhen
and Shanghai’s residential housing markets, Bayes factors favor Model 4 over other models.
The constant parameter Model 8 is decisively rejected by data. This suggests that estate-
specific heterogeneity plays an important role in explaining the price-to-rent ratio. The
empirical results for the rest of the paper pertain to Model 4 (αi = α for all estates).
3.3. Posterior properties the latent rent
Tables 2 and 3 report the cross-estate average of the posterior mean and standard devi-
ations of parameters in Model 4. Posterior mean, our benchmark estimator, is the Bayesian
estimator under quadratic loss. The posterior mean of estate specific intercept µi ranges
from 2.5 to 5.5, indicating a substantial quality difference in the neighborhood characteris-
tics, environmental features, and accessability of various estates.
Structural attributes identified in the previous studies of hedonic pricing, such as the
floor level and the number of bedrooms, are available in Shanghai. The number of floor level
of the apartment has an ambiguous effect on price. This may be because for apartments in a
high-rise housing complex, the higher the floor level the better air quality and view. On the
other hand, because most of low-rise apartment buildings are not equipped with elevators,
high floor level may be a negative factor. Tables 2 and 3 also report the estimates of other
parameters in the model.
The number of bedrooms is negatively correlated with the rent (per square meter) while
the number of living rooms and restrooms is positively correlated with rent. In addition,
we find that compared with a unfurnished apartment, a plainly furnished apartment does
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not raise rent by much, while a luxuriously decorated one on average raises rent by about
12 percent. Real mortgage rate is found to be negatively correlated with housing prices.
An one percent increase in real mortgage rate drives the housing price down by 9.3 percent
in Shanghai and by 5.2 percent in Shenzhen. On average, the number of observations for
each estate of Shenzhen is about 1.5 times of that of Shanghai. Hence under similar priors,
the posterior for Shenzhen should be tighter. On the other hand, the data set for Shanghai
contains more hedonic features of the units sold and rented. The overall fit of the model for
the two markets are comparable. The posterior means of the variance of the pricing error
σ2i are similar for Shanghai and Shenzhen.
Tables 4 and 5 report the sample average and standard deviations of the posterior means
and posterior standard deviations of the factors that influence the price-rent ratio. The
tables illustrate the prominent role of the estate-fixed effect. The unit factor and mortgage
rate play more significant roles in Shanghai than in Shenzhen. The average estimate of 1.925
for land-user right (which is only observed for Shenzhen) accounts for roughly thirty-six
percent of the price-to-rent ratio for units sold in Shenzhen. The cross-estate variation in
the land user right is small because the housing reform only started in late 1990s and the
transactions in the sample occurred within a short period of time. One may incorporate the
land-user right into the estate fixed effect in price-to-rent ratio fi. The correlation between
fi and estate fixed effect in rent ci is not significant altered if we do so.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the posterior mean and the posterior 10 and 90 percentiles of
the price-to-rent ratio of each unit sold and fixed effect µi of each estate of Shanghai and
Shenzhen. The horizontal axis corresponds to estates of each city sorted by the posterior
mean of µi. These figures exhibit two distinct features. First, the posterior distributions of
the price-to-rent rent ratio and that of estate quality (µi) are quite tight, i.e., the estate-
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specific fixed effects are estimated with high precision relative to the cross sectional difference.
Second, the price-to-rent ratio of low-end housing is higher than that of high-end housing,
especially for Shanghai.
Figures 3 and 4 show a positive cross-estate correlation between the fixed effect in rent,
µi, with the fixed effect in price, ci. There is a substantial portion of the cross-estate
variation in the pricing factor ci that are not explained by µi. Across estates, ci are more
strongly correlated with µi in the Shanghai market than the Shenzhen market. This is
because the data of Shanghai include richer hedonic features. For the Shenzhen sample,
most of the variation in rent is explained by the estate-fixed effect rather than unit-specific
features. Consequently the estimate of α (price elasticity with respect to rent) is larger for
the Shanghai sample.
3.4. ‘Within’ estates and ‘between’ estates decomposition of price-to-rent
ratios
In the following, we will examine the ‘within’ estates and ‘between’ estate variations of the
posterior means and posterior standard deviations of (λij, fi, uij, eij,mij), which characterize
the cross-unit and cross-estate distributions of the price-rent ratio and its determinants.
Comparisons of the patterns of these variations shed new light on the housing markets of
the two cities.
An essential difference between the cities of Shanghai and Shenzhen lies in their histories.
Shanghai is a city of several hundred of years old, with well developed historic districts and
recently developed suburban districts. Shenzhen, a major city with more than eight million
residents, on the other hand, was a small fishing town three decades ago and was developed
when it was designated as the Special Economic Zone in 1979. One would expect larger
dispersion in estate-fixed effect in Shanghai than in Shenzhen.
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Tables 6 and 7 show the cross-unit (‘within’-estate) and ‘between’-estate distributions of
the point estimate of the price-rent ratio. Consistent with the cities history of development,
the magnitude of cross-estate (‘between’) price-rent ratios and estate fixed factors are much
larger for Shanghai than for Shenzhen. In contrast, the cross-unit (‘within’) estate distribu-
tions are similar for Shanghai and Shenzhen. We also consider the price-rent ratio and its
determinants from a different perspective, by examining the posterior means and standard
deviations of ‘within’ and ‘between’ variations of (λij, fi, uij, eij,mij), the point estimate and
posterior uncertainty (precision) of cross-unit and cross-estate variations of the price-rent
ratio and its determinants. These unreported estimates are similar to those in Tables 6 and
7.
4. Explain the Negative Correlation between Rent and Price-to-Rent Ratio
The negative correlation between the estate-specific fixed effect in the price-rent ratio,
fi, and the fixed effect of rent, µi, warrants further discussion. We consider three types of
explanations in subsections 4.1 to 4.3 for the negative correlation.
4.1 Estimation errors in rent fixed effect (µi)
First, note that the negative cross-estate correlation between fi = ci+(α−1)µi and µi may
be partly due to the estimation errors in µi. Suppose the ‘true’ parameter is f
∗
i = ci+(α−1)µ
∗
i
and µ∗i , and suppose µi = µ
∗
i + vi, where the error v is uncorrelated with µ or c. Then the
cross-estate covariance
cov(fi, µi) = E(fi − f¯)(µi − µ¯)
= E{[ci + (α− 1)(µ
∗
i + vi)− c¯− (α− 1)µ¯](µ
∗
i − µ¯+ vi)}
= E{(f ∗i − f¯i)(µ
∗
i − µ¯)}+ (α− 1)Ev
2
i .
Since the estimate of α is smaller than unity, the covariance has a downward bias (α−1)Ev2i .
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We will show that for two reasons the magnitude of this bias is small for the present problem.
First, if we use the posterior variance of µi to proxy that of the estimation error vi,
then based on the statistics reported in Tables 2 and 4, and the fact that the cross-estate
standard deviation µi is 0.53 for the Shanghai data (not reported in the tables),
(α−1)Ev2
i
sd(fi)sd(µi)
is
roughly (0.29−1)×0.11
2
0.39×0.53
≈ −0.04, much lower than the sample correlation −0.87 (for Shanghai).
For the Shenzhen data, the cross-estate standard deviation µi is 0.39. Given the numbers
reported in Tables 2 and 4, the contribution from estimation error in the estate-fixed effects
of rent is approximately
(α−1)Ev2
i
sd(fi)sd(µi)
= (0.148−1)×0.08
2
0.24×0.39
≈ −0.06, negligible compared to −0.63,
the negative correlation between the the posterior mean of fi and that of µi. Note that
because the lack of hedonic features of housing units in Shenzhen data, the unit-specific rent
plays a smaller role in explaining price in Shenzhen than in Shanghai. In particular, the
estimate of α (0.148) for the Shenzhen sample is half the magnitude of that of Shanghai
(0.290). For a given estimation error in the estate-fixed effect µi, the downward bias in
the cross-estate correlation between fi and µi for Shenzhen should be larger than that for
Shanghai. Yet the obtained sample correlation for Shenzhen (−0.63) is higher than that of
Shanghai (−0.87). This suggests that besides estimation error in µi, there are fundamental
reasons that the price-to-rent ratio is negatively correlated with latent rent.
Second, estimation error in µi leads to negative bias in the correlation between fi and µi
when α is less than unity. To shut down this source of bias, we consider a more restrictive
pricing model by setting αi = 1 in (1), with the rent equation unchanged. The corresponding
price-to-rent ratio becomes
Pij − Rˆij = ci + y
′
ijβ + ij. (7)
Now the estate specific factor fi = ci. The resultant cross-estate correlation between the
posterior mean of fi and µi is −0.86 for Shanghai and −0.56 for Shenzhen, not much different
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from the values reported earlier. We conclude that the negative cross-estate correlation
between the price-to-rent ratio and latent rent is not a statistical artifact and warrants
economic explanations.
4.2 Growth potentials of low-rent high price-to-rent ratio estates
One explanation for the negative correlation between latent rent and price-to-rent ratio is
that low-rent estates tend to have higher potential for future growth and commend a higher
price-to-rent ratio. The expected return to housing is IE( future price
current price
) + rent
current price
. Hence
in an economy consists of risk-neutral investors, equalization of the expected return to all
estates implies that owners of high price-to-rent properties should expect fast appreciation in
housing price. Using MSA level data, Capozza & Seguin (1996) show that the price-to-rent
ratio is useful in predicting long-run housing price appreciation, but only if the differences
in the quality of rental versus owner-occupied housing are controlled.
We find ample evidence in Shanghai data that supports this theory. Specifically, we
discover that estates in newly developed locations that are away from city center of Shanghai
tend to command low rent, high price-to-rent ratio, and better growth potential. There are
thirteen administrative districts of Shanghai. Sorting the districts by the average price
reveals a pattern that the high-price districts located in the old city of Shanghai with high
population density and with established shopping areas and restaurants. In comparison,
estates in newly developed suburban districts tend to be cheaper in price and rent, but with
higher price-to-rent ratio. The premium in housing price in the low price districts in part
reflects the growth potential of the expanding suburban districts in the Shanghai. From 2003
to 2005, the population density of the suburban districts increased while that of the historic
downtown districts remained unchanged or even decreased. Growth in allocation of public
goods is faster in Shanghai’s suburban districts. From 2003 to 2005, the teacher-student ratio
16
increased in suburban districts more than it did in the old city districts. This trend in the
improvement of public education in the low rent-high price/rent ratio districts point to their
better prospects of price appreciation. We argue that the difference between Shanghai and
Shenzhen lends support to the location-dependent growth potential theory. The negative
correlation between fi and µi is stronger in Shanghai than in Shenzhen partly because
in Shanghai the low-rent estates are more concentrated in the lightly populated suburban
districts while districts in Shenzhen the districts are similar and correlation between rent
and growth potential is weaker.
The higher growth of remote districts explains a portion of the negative correlation
between fi and µi, but it is unlikely to be the only factor. The within-district correlations
between fi and µi are also negative (about −0.7 on average within districts of Shanghai and
−0.3 within districts of Shenzhen). This suggests that the presence of other factors for the
negative correlation between fi and µi. These factors are considered in the following.
4.3. Strong demand of low-end units induced by factors in housing market
and government policy
The notion that low quality housing is more expensive (relative to the fundamentals) than
high quality housing is not new. Sweeney (1974) presents a theoretical model on equilibrium
of indivisible goods with quality hierarchy. He shows that replacing a low quality unit by
a high quality one creates a chain reaction that lowers the prices of all units with quality
higher than a threshold level and raises the prices of all units with quality below that level.
The accumulation of the new constructions then make the low-end housing more expensive
relative to the high-end housing.
The price of housing may be systematically related to factors other than the service flow
of the housing for various reasons. Genesove & Mayer (1997) show that the price of housing
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is affected by the owner’s equity. Housing units with higher loan-to-equity ratio tend to
be more expensive and take longer to sell. Another possible explanation is that low-end
housing may carry higher risk premium. For the U.S. market, Sinai & Souleles (2005) show
that regional prices of real estates are positively related with the volatility of risk of rents
in the region. In our sample, if renters of low-end housing are more averse of unexpected
increase in rent than renters of high-end housing, or the growth rate in the rent of low-end
housing is more uncertain, then owners of low-end housing are willing to pay a higher price.
In addition, the low-end housing units is more expensive given its hedonic features because
they tend to be traded more frequently. The transaction cost, commissions, transaction tax
are paid more times on low-end units. Case et al. (1997) find that properties that transact
more frequently tend to be at the lower-end (starters or fix-uppers) but experience faster price
appreciation. Although their finding does not directly relate the frequency of transactions
to price-to-rent ratio, it is consistent with the scenario that starter units are more frequently
traded at higher price-to-rent ratios.
Stein (1995) studies the effect of down-payment requirement on housing price dynamics.
He shows that the requirement of down-payment amplifies the magnitude of price fluctua-
tions and creates a positive correlation between price movement and trading volume. The
down-payment requirement also have cross-section effect on prices. The high housing price
(relative to income) of the two Chinese cities coupled with the thirty percent down-payment
requirement for standard mortgages make housing unaffordable for a large fraction of resi-
dents. In markets where fast appreciation in housing price is anticipated, households often
own maximum amount of housing permitted by the ability to pay. As the income and saving
of potential buyers rise above a threshold, the majority of the first-time home buyers pur-
chase low-end units. This elevates demand of low-end housing and makes it relatively more
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expensive than high-end housing. The theory also predicts that the larger the dispersion in
quality the more expensive the low-end housing is. The evidence in the two cities confirms
this prediction. The estate-specific factor is much more diverse in Shanghai than in Shen-
zhen. The negative correlation of the price-to-rent ratio and latent rent is also stronger in
Shanghai.
Finally, the demand for low-end housing maybe disproportionately raised by government
policies. Studies on similar policies in other countries yield the same conclusion. Susin (2002)
finds evidence that rent vouchers for low income households in the U.S. elevate the price of
low-end housing. Vigdor (2006) finds empirical evidence that U.S. government policy that
relaxes liquidity constraint for veterans pushes up housing price. Mortgage subsidies for low-
end housing raises its demand for low-end housing in Shanghai and Shenzhen. According
to the lending policy of China People’s Bank, low income households that purchase low-end
housing (with its size and price below a threshold) are eligible for subsided mortgage loans
for 60 months. Empirical estimation of the factors discussed above will be left for future
research.
4.4 Policy implications of high price of low-end housing
An adverse welfare implication of high price-to-rent ratio of low-end housing is that low-
income households pay a relatively high price for the service of housing they own. The policy
remedy to the resultant inequity is far from being obvious. Numerous studies (e.g., Susin
(2002) and Vigdor (2006) discussed above) show that housing subsides to low-income families
in the form of mortgage or rent assistance likely make the low-end housing more expensive,
which at least partially offset the intended policy objective of housing affordablity. Owning
the low-end housing can be rationalized by a higher expected price appreciation or higher
risk premium for hedging rent growth. However, the ownership of low-end housing makes
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low- and middle-income families more vulnerable to a downturn in housing market when
they invest a large portion of household wealth in housing. Because at the low-end it is more
expensive to own than to rent, government policies promoting ownership of low-end housing
may reduce the welfare of its owner ex-post.
The large difference in the price-to-rent ratio between high-end and low-end housing
found in this study also implies that different segments of housing should be treated as
different asset classes from the investment perspective. Owner-occupied housing is the most
valuable investment for many households. Higher price-to-rent ratio of low-end housing
means that its owner holds an asset resembles to a stock with a high price-to-dividend ratio.
Because the owner-occupied housing is sorted by income, unlike investment in financial assets
that are available to all investors, low-income households unwittingly hold a class of housing
investment with different risk characteristics from the those held by high-income households.
It is useful to analyze investment strategies for households with different income levels while
taking into account the difference in risk of owner-occupied housing. For the purpose of
diversification, it is useful to construct housing indices of low-end housing as a separate
asset class from high-end housing.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate how prices of housing units relate to their latent rents. Our
cross-sectional analysis of the housing price-to-rent ratio adds to the literature of real-estate
pricing based on the present value of rent, hedonic features, and repeated sales. The model
consisting of price and rent equations contains several thousands of parameters. Bayesian
model selection indicates strong heterogeneity in the parameters across estates. The esti-
mated price-to-rent ratios differ substantially across estates (e.g., the cross-estate standard
deviation of the logarithm of price-to-rent ratio is about forty percent in Shanghai.) We
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analyze the factors that influence the price-to-rent ratio. We find that the estate fixed-effect
of the price-rent ratio is negatively correlated with the estate fixed-effect of rent. This find-
ing agrees with several economic theories and affords us new perspectives in investment and
public policy in housing.
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Appendix
The joint posterior is
pi(α, β , µ, θ, σ, τ , c | D)
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The following conditional posteriors are used for Gibbs sampling:
(i)
pi(µi | τi, θ, Rˆi,D)
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i
),
where µ˜ik = Rik − x
′
ikθ, µˆij = Rˆij − x
′
ijθ.
(ii)
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
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The conditional posteriors suggest a Gibbs sampling MCMC algorithm: In cycle k, with
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Some of the Gibbs sampling steps can be combined to simulate a larger block of param-
eters, for example, steps (2) and (3) can be combined to simulate (c, α). We present the
algorithm based on the conditional posterior for each parameter vector because it is most
transparent and is applicable to different models (for example, the four combinations that c
and/or α may be estate-specific or constant across estates).
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Table 1: Bayesian model selection, log(marginal likelihoods) of Shanghai and Shenzhen data
ci µi αi log-m.l (Shanghai) log-m.l (Shenzhen)
Model 1 estate-specific estate-specific estate-specific -3068.93 -73.75
Model 2 constant estate-specific estate-specific -1623.71 6.32
Model 3 estate-specific constant estate-specific -8379.62 -1945.48
Model 4 estate-specific estate-specific constant -1519.32 315.73
Model 5 constant constant estate-specific -8208.22 -1821.96
Model 6 constant estate-specific constant -1821.83 -146.12
Model 7 estate-specific constant constant -7508.37 -1839.41
Model 8 constant constant constant -8471.34 -2151.23
Note: A parameter is labeled ‘estate-specific’ (‘constant’) when it is assumed to be differ-
ent (the same) across estates. The marginal likelihood of Model i (i = 1, · · · , 8) is computed
by integrating out all parameters in the posterior under Model i. A difference of 5 between
the log marginal likelihoods of two models is considered a strong evidence in favor of the
model with the larger marginal likelihood. By this criterion, Model 4 is the best model.
29
Table 2: Bayesian estimates averaged over estates, Shanghai
parameter Average of Posterior Mean Average of Posterior STD
price model
ci 8.5193 0.0889
α(constant) 0.2903 0.0068
βi: real mortgage rate -0.0934 0.0017
σ2i 0.0330 0.0181
rent model
µi 3.7280 0.1126
θ
floor level 0.0050 0.0005
number of bedroom -0.1068 0.0085
number of livingroom -0.0659 0.0090
number of restroom 0.0081 0.0052
decoration: simple 0.0003 0.0067
decoration:luxury 0.1213 0.0079
size -0.0001 0.0001
τ2i 0.0657 0.0305
Note: The results pertain to Model 4 (selected based on the Bayes factor.) The posterior
of parameter of each estate is simulated using the MCMC algorithm stated in the paper.
From the numerical distribution we compute the posterior mean and posterior standard
deviation for each parameter. The first column is obtained by averaging the posterior mean
over all estates. The second column is obtained by averaging the posterior standard deviation
over all estates. The estimates of seasonal and year dummies are not reported.
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Table 3: Bayesian estimates averaged over estates, Shenzhen
parameter Average of Posterior Mean Average of Posterior STD
price model
ci 6.0685 0.1265
α (constant) 0.1482 0.0314
β1i : real mortgage rate -0.0524 0.0035
β2i: land user right 0.0308 0.0014
σ2i 0.0361 0.0168
rent model
µi 3.5822 0.0808
θ
Size -0.0012 0.0001
τ2i 0.0579 0.0233
Note: See the note of Table 2.
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Table 4: Decomposition of the price-to-rent ratio, Shanghai
parameter Posterior Mean Average Posterior Std Average
λij 5.8867(0.4346) 0.2471(0.0571)
fi 5.9025(0.3911) 0.0987(0.0455)
uij 0.2385(0.1195) 0.0278(0.0053)
mij -0.2543(0.1211) 0.0047(0.0022)
Table 5: Decomposition of the price-to-rent ratio, Shenzhen
parameter Posterior Mean Average Posterior Std Average
λij 5.3184 (0.2451) 0.2516 (0.0966)
fi 3.3551 (0.2156) 0.1221 (0.0290)
uij 0.0926 (0.0534) 0.0162 (0.0027)
mij -0.0548 (0.0630) 0.0039 (0.0041)
eij 1.9251 (0.1072) 0.0889 (0.0050)
Note for Tables 4 and 5: The posterior of parameter of each estate is simulated using the
MCMC algorithm stated in the paper. From the numerical distribution we compute the
posterior mean and posterior standard deviation for each term in equation (5). The first
column is obtained by averaging the posterior mean of these terms over all estates. The
second column is obtained by averaging the posterior standard deviation of the terms over
all estates. Numbers in parenthesis in the first (second) column are standard deviations of
the posterior mean (posterior standard deviation) across all estates.
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Table 6: ‘Within’ and ‘between’ variations in the posterior means of price-to-rent ratios,
Shanghai
Between-Estate Variation of Posterior Mean Within Estate Variation of Posterior Mean
λij 0.1607 0.0299
fi 0.1538 NA
uij 0.0046 0.0098
mij 0.0038 0.0108
Table 7: ‘Within’ and ‘between’ variations in the posterior means of price-to-rent ratios,
Shenzhen
Between-Estate Variation of Posterior Mean Within Estate Variation of Posterior Mean
λij 0.0520 0.0315
fi 0.0309 NA
uij 0.0010 0.0019
mij 0.0009 0.0031
lij 0.0116 0.0004
Notes for Tables 6 and 7: The tables report the ‘within estates’ and ‘between estates’ varia-
tions of the posterior mean of each term in equation (5). Let zij be a generic notation for a
quantity of interest of estate i (= 1, · · · , N) and unit sold j (j = 1, · · · , Ji). Denote the within
estate average zi. =
1
Ji
∑
j zij and the whole sample average z. =
1
N
∑
i zi.. The ‘within’ and
‘between’ variations of quantity of zij are given by
1
N
∑
i
1
Ji
∑
j(zij − zi.)
2 and 1
N
∑
i(zi.− z.)
2.
The posterior of parameter of each estate is simulated using the MCMC algorithm stated in
the paper.
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Figure 1: Price-to-rent ratio λij and estate fixed effect µi (Shanghai)
0 200 400 600
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
estate i=1,2...733
lo
g
(p
ri
c
e
/r
e
n
t)
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
mu(i)
Figure 2: Price-to-rent ratio λij and estate fixed effect µi (Shenzhen)
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Note: Figure 1 (Shanghai) and Figure 2 (Shenzhen) plot the posterior mean and the posterior
10 and 90 percentiles of the price-to-rent ratio of each unit sold λij (in black) and those of
the estate-fixed effect µi in rent (in red). The estates on the horizonal axis are sorted by the
posterior mean of µi.
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Figure 3: Correlation between estate fixed effect in pricing ci and estate fixed effect in rent
µi (Shanghai)
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Figure 4: Correlation between estate fixed effect in pricing ci and estate fixed effect in rent
µi (Shenzhen)
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Note: Figures 3 and 4 plot the posterior mean of ci for estate i against µi. ci appears in the
price equation (1) and µi appears in the rent equation (2). The posterior of parameter of
each estate is simulated using the MCMC algorithm stated in the paper. The cross-estate
correlation between the posterior means of ci and µi is 0.2265 for Shanghai in Figure 3 and
is 0.6315 for Shenzhen in Figure 4.
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Figure 5: Correlation between estate fixed effect in price-to-rent ratio fi and estate fixed
effect in rent µi (Shanghai)
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Figure 6: Correlation between estate fixed effect in price-to-rent ratio fi and estate fixed
effect in rent µi (Shenzhen)
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Note: Figures 5 and 6 plot the posterior mean of fi for estate i against µi. fi is the fixed
effect of price-to-rent ratio in equation (5) and µi appears in the rent equation (2). The
posterior of parameter of each estate is simulated using the MCMC algorithm stated in the
paper. The cross-estate correlation between the posterior means of fi and µi is -0.8671 in
Figure 5 (Shanghai data) and -0.6257 (Shenzhen data).
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